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Real Property

by Linda S. Finley*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A review of the survey of real property law for the last several years
shows an evolution of topics.' One year the creation of the Georgia Fair
Lending Act,2 and the duties that new legislation placed upon attorneys
and lenders was a critical topic; the following year (and the next), the
topic of interest was how title to church property is determined when a
congregation splits.' For the last few years, the downturn in the
Georgia and national economy, and the protection of consumers under
foreclosure laws and from the unauthorized practice of law, have seen
both judicial and legislative scrutiny. Couple these sometimes emerging,
yet always important, issues with traditional areas of real property law,
such as boundary disputes, easements, title to property, zoning and the
like, and the conclusion can only be that the modern real estate
practitioner must stay current and knowledgeable about a myriad of
topics that change from year to year.

* Shareholder in the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC,
Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia and Florida,
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court.
The Author wishes to give special thanks to Teta Hakim for handling the administrative
tasks necessary to bring this survey Article to print. Additional thanks goes to Carol V.
Clark, Esq. Particularly, the Author directs the reader to Carol V. Clark, 2015 Judicial
Update, 2015 REAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE MATERIALS (Institute of Continuing Legal
Education in Georgia) (2015).
1. For an analysis of Georgia real property during the prior survey period, see Linda
S. Finley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 66 MERCER L. REV. 151 (2014).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ A-1 to -13 (Supp. 2013); see also Linda Finley, Real Property, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law 55 MERCER L. REv. 397 (2003).
3. Rector, Wardens & Vestryman of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of the
Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc., 305 Ga. App. 87, 609 S.E.2d 45 (2010), affd No.
S10G1909, 2011 WL 5830140 (Ga. Nov. 21, 2011); see also Linda S. Finley, Real Property,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 309, 313 (2011).
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LEGISLATION

The time-honored tradition of Sine Die ended Day 40 of the 2015
Georgia legislative session on Thursday, April 2, 2015. Although the
most newsworthy legislation was perhaps the legalization of marijuana
for medicinal use,4 not to be lost are several pieces of legislation
important to real estate practice.
The Georgia General Assembly enacted House Bill 322,' which
changed the provisions of the Georgia Code relating to the witnessing
requisites for deeds, mortgages, and bills of sale and provides for the
filing of deeds under power within a certain time after foreclosure sale
and assessment of a fine for late filing.' Specifically, sections three
through seven of the bill changed the attestation requirements for
mortgages and security deeds.7 Under the prior statute, a mortgage or
security deed had to be signed by two witnesses to the grantor's
signature.' Such instruments also had to be witnessed or acknowledged
in front of a notary or other authorized officer.9
Generally, this
requirement meant security deeds would have one official witness
(notary) and one unofficial witness. However, in cases where a deed was
acknowledged to the notary (that is, situations in which the notary did
not actually see the grantor sign the deed, but the notary was told by
the grantor that the signature on the deed was his or hers), a deed was
to have one official "witness and two unofficial witnesses."10 This
requirement was the subject of much litigation, mostly as the result of
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Georgia seeking to avoid security deeds that
were not properly witnessed."
The bill also amended section 44-14-160 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 1 2 to establish a $500 penalty for the late filing in
the real property records of a deed under power or other deed evidencing

Ga. H.R. Bill 1, Reg. Sess. (2015).
Ga. H.R. Bill 322, Reg. Sess. (2015).
Id.
See id. §§ 3-7.
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-30 (2010).
See id.; see generally Z&Y Corp. v. Indore C. Stores, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 163, 638
760 (2006), reconsiderationdenied (Nov. 1, 2006).
See generallyVizard v. Moody, 119 Ga. 918, 47 S.E. 348 (1904); see also DANIEL F.
HINKEL, PINDAR'S GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE § 19:60 (7th ed. 2013).
11. See, e.g., Haynes v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, No. 1:11-CV-3149-TWT-LTW, 2014 U.S.
District LEXIS 109869, at *42-43 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 2014).
12. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160 (2002 & Supp. 2015).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
S.E.2d
10.
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a foreclosure."a The penalty applies if the deed is recorded more than
120 days after the date of the foreclosure sale.' The penalty will be
collected by the clerk of court at the time the deed is presented for
recording.'" The new statute states the penalty will be paid by the
holder of the deed to secure debt or mortgage, so it is unclear who will
be required to pay the penalty in cases when a property is sold to a third
party at the foreclosure sale and the deed under power is delivered to
the third party prior to recording.' 6 The previous version of this
statute required deeds under power to be recorded within 90 days of a
foreclosure sale, but it did not establish a penalty for failure to record a
deed within that timeframe." That version of the statute was often
cited by borrower's counsel, who argued that the failure to record a deed
under power within the statutory timeframe made the deed invalid."
While the new statutory language creates a late filing penalty for the
first time, it specifically allows the late filing of foreclosure deeds and
eliminates the argument that a late filed deed is invalid." The
amendments became effective on July 1, 2015.20
Senate Bill 10121 was enacted to amend the state law protecting
coastal marshlands in relation to control of soil erosion and sedimentation, including prohibiting certain activities that would disturb
wetlands. 2 2
The legislation amended O.C.G.A. § 12-7-323 to add
definitions for "coastal marshlands," making it consistent with other
sections of the code and defining "maintenance" as "actions necessary or
appropriate for retaining or restoring" the marshlands, including
emergency reconstruction of damaged structures.2 4 Most importantly,
the legislation added language to the statute to create a "25 foot buffer"
along coastal marshlands and to establish and define what, along the
buffer zone, could be maintained, and the amendment specifically
identifies such structures as landscaping, hardscaping, "bridges, roads,
parking lots, golf courses, golf cart paths, retaining walls, bulkheads,

13. Ga. H.R. Bill 322, § 9 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160(b) (Supp. 2015)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (see prior version at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160 (2002)).
18. See, e.g., Harper v. Aneris Bank, 326 Ga. App. 67, 755 S.E.2d 872 (2014).
19. Ga. H.R. 322, 29; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160(b).
20. Status History, 2014-2015 Regular Session - H.B. 322, GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.legis.ga.gov/en-us/Display/20142015/HB/322 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
21. Ga. S. Bill 101, Reg. Sess. (2015).
22. Id.
23. O.C.G.A. § 12-7-3 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
24. Ga. S. Bill 101, § 1; see also O.C.G.A. § 12-7-3(2.1), (10.1) (Supp. 2015).
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and patios; provided, however, that if such maintenance requires any
land-disturbing activity, adequate erosion control measures are
incorporated into the project plans and specifications and such measures
are fully implemented."" The statute is very detailed about what
measures must be taken and what exceptions are allowed, and the
statute provides protection to fragile marshlands by including that "[n]o
land-disturbing activity shall be conducted within [the twenty-five foot]
buffer and a buffer shall remain in its current, undisturbed state of
vegetation until all land-disturbing activities on the construction site are
completed .... 26 The statute provides that once stabilization of the
area is completed, the buffer can be trimmed of vegetation, if some
protective vegetation remains, to protect the water quality and the
aquatic habitat."
A third piece of important legislation was House Bill 477, which
amended O.C.G.A. § 32-7-4,29 concerning the procedures for disposing
of property formerly acquired for public road purposes and later abandoned.o The amendment provides that if all or a portion of roadway
property, which is subject to disposition, is located in a subdivision that
has a property owner's association, the notice of the abandonment of the
roadway may be provided to a property owner's association in lieu of
notifying the individual owners of the abutting land.3 ' The amendment
provides guidance for newly incorporated municipalities and how they
"assume ownership and control of county road rights of way located
within" the newly incorporated areas.32
III.

CONDEMNATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN

While the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals
issued many decisions in the area of eminent domain, the decisions
largely clarified existing law concerning evidentiary issues, procedural

25. Ga. S. Bill 101, § 2; see also O.C.G.A. § 12-7-6(b)(15)(a), (b)(17)(A)(iv), (b)(17)(B)
(2012 & Supp. 2015).
26. Ga. S. Bill 101, § 2; see also O.C.G.A. § 12-7-6(b)(17)(B).
27. See O.C.G.A. § 12-7-6(b)(17)(B).
28. Ga. H.R. Bill 477, Reg. Sess. (2015).
29. O.C.G.A. § 32-7-4 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
30. Ga, H.R. Bill 477.
31. Id. § 1.
32. Ga. H.R. Bill 477.
33. This section was authored by Ivy N. Cadle, shareholder in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Macon, Georgia. Adjunct Professor of Law,
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law. University of Georgia (B.S., cum
laude, 2000; Macc, 2002); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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The three cases summarized here concern
issues, and standing.
interesting issues related to inverse condemnation, double recovery, and
special master proceedings.
In DeKalb County v. Heath," William Heath, Jr. filed an inverse
condemnation alleging that DeKalb County (County) maintained a
continuing nuisance. Heath claimed the County failed to repair its
larger storm water drainage system allowing a retaining wall along a
creek bed to fail, causing flooding and erosion of Heath's property. After
a bench trial, Heath was awarded $28,830 in damages, the cost to repair
the retaining wall. The County appealed two findings." First, the
County contended the trial court erred when it failed to find Heath's
action was barred by res judicata.36 Second, the County contended
Heath's award was an impermissible double recovery." The Georgia
Court of Appeals disagreed on both counts and affirmed the decision."
The County's appellate arguments were based on a prior lawsuit
where Heath and another plaintiff sued the County for inverse
condemnation arising from flooding and erosion of their properties
(Heath 1). In 2012, a jury awarded the plaintiffs $7000 in damages for
claims arising from Heath 1. The subject action was filed in March
2011, while Heath 1 was still pending. In Heath 1, Heath did not make
a specific claim for damages related to the allegations that the County's
retaining wall was improperly constructed and it suffered continuing
deterioration with each rain event.3 ' To support its argument that the
subject action was barred by res judicata, the County argued that Heath
could have amended the Heath 1 complaint to include allegations of
specific damages related to the retaining wall.40
The court of appeals disagreed and noted that res judicata does not
necessarily bar a claim for subsequent damage caused by continuing
injurious action. 4 ' The court held the two causes of actions were not
identical even though they were based on similar facts.4 2 In Heath 1,
the action concerned the diminished value of Heath's property due to
flooding and erosion. That diminution in value resulted from the
County's failure to maintain its overall storm water and drainage
system. The subject suit concerned ongoing damage to a specific

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

331 Ga. App. 179, 770 S.E.2d 269 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 424 (2015).
Id. at 179, 179-80, 180, 770 S.E.2d at 270-71, 271.
Id. at 180, 770 S.E.2d at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 180, 182, 770 S.E.2d at 271, 272.
Id. at 182, 770 S.E.2d at 272.
Id.
Id.
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component of the storm water drainage system; more particularly, it
involved a deteriorating retaining wall that had not failed at the time
Heath 1 was filed.4 3
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling because the
subject action only sought damages for the cost to repair the wall and
not diminution damages." Accordingly, the court held that "the two
actions [do] not share identical causes of action, and the present action
involved a fresh nuisance for which a fresh action would lie . . . ."" To
directly address the County's contention that Heath received a double
recovery, the court pointed out that the trial court limited its award to
the cost of repair of the retaining wall and did not award judgment for
the diminution of the value of Heath's property, which Heath had been
awarded in Heath 1.46 The court's ruling means that in an inverse
condemnation, a subsequent lawsuit may be viable for a similar problem
if there is a subsequent failure of a distinct component of the improvement and if the damages sought in the second lawsuit are distinct from
the damages sought in the first lawsuit. However, the better practice
would be to amend a pending complaint and include any subsequent
damages caused by similar factual events.
In DillardLand Investments, LLC v. Fulton County," Fulton County
(County) sought to condemn real property owned by Dillard Land
Investments, LLC (Dillard). The County initiated a special master
proceeding and, after a hearing before a special master, the property
owner was awarded $5,187,500 in just and adequate compensation. The
trial court entered an order on the special master's award, and title to
the property was to vest in the County after it paid the award into the
court registry. Instead of paying the award into the registry, the County
filed a voluntary dismissal of the condemnation action. Dillard objected
to the County's voluntary dismissal, and the trial court issued an order
denying the County's motion to vacate the condemnation. The court of
appeals granted the County's certificate of immediate review and
reversed the trial court's denial of the County's motion to vacate the
condemnation. Dillard's appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court followed.4 8

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 183, 770 S.E.2d at 272-73.
295 Ga. 515, 761 S.E.2d 282 (2014).
Id. at 515, 515-16, 517, 518, 761 S.E.2d at 284, 285.
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The court of appeals began its analysis by reviewing O.C.G.A. § 22-112," which entitles property owners to recover attorney fees and
expenses when a condemnor abandons a condemnation action.o In
light of O.C.G.A. § 22-1-12, the court of appeals examined Gramm v. City
of Stockbridge," the only reported decision citing the statute at the
time." The court of appeals held the trial court erred by preventing
the County from unilaterally dismissing the condemnation action.
Upon review, the Georgia Supreme Court held the court of appeals
erred by relying on O.C.G.A. § 22-1-12." Instead, the supreme court
determined that the court of appeals should have followed the precedents
prohibiting voluntary dismissal after assessors filed awards." In
examining those precedents, the supreme court noted the principle
expressed in the general voluntary dismissal cases "accords with and
undergirds" the cases refusing to allow voluntary dismissal of the
condemnation action after assessors have rendered a value decision.56
Accordingly, the court held the question of the timing for dismissal was
governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4157 and that O.C.G.A. § 22-1-12 merely
reallocated the costs imposed on the condemnor if it abandons a
condemnation." The court held that a condemning authority cannot
dismiss its condemnation when the condemnor knows the amount of the
value award." "Once the special master announces his award, if the
condemnor believes that the value placed on the property is too high, the
only remedy is to appeal the award for a de novo jury determination of
value under O.C.G.A. § 22-2-112. . . ."'
The lesson from this case is that a condemning authority cannot
obtain a value determination from a special master and then dismiss the
condemnation case. If a condemning authority seeks to dismiss a
condemnation action in which a special master is to determine the value,

49. O.C.G.A. § 22-1-12 (Supp. 2015).
50. Id.
51. 297 Ga. App. 165, 676 S.E.2d 818 (2009), cert. denied, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 597 (2009).
52. DillardLand Inus., LLC, 295 Ga. at 517, 761 S.E.2d at 285; see also Gramm, 297
Ga. App. at 166, 676 S.E.2d at 819.
53. DillardLand Inos., LLC, 295 Ga. at 517-18, 761 S.E.2d at 285.
54. Id. at 522, 761 S.E.2d at 288.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 521, 761 S.E.2d at 288 (citing Thomas v. Cent. of Georgia Ry. Co., 169 Ga.
269, 149 S.E. 884 (1929) and Hous. Auth. of Atlanta v. Mercer, 123 Ga. App. 38, 179 S.E.2d
275 (1970)).
57. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41 (2015).
58. DillardLand Invs., LLC, 295 Ga. at 523, 761 S.E.2d at 289.
59. Id.
60. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 22-2-112 (1982 & Supp. 2015).

200

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

the action should be dismissed immediately if the special master hearing
went poorly for the condemnor.
In Pennington v. Gwinnett County,61 Steve and Brenda Pennington
appealed a grant of summary judgment where the trial court prevented
them from recovering from Gwinnett County (County) after the
Penningtons lost a cell phone tower deal with T-Mobile South, LLC (TMobile).62 In 2008, the Penningtons entered into an option contract
where T-Mobile had an opportunity to lease a portion of Penningtons'
property to locate a cell phone tower. The "Site Lease with Option"
(Option) allowed T-Mobile a renewable, twelve-month term to evaluate
the site. The Option required payment of $1000 by T-Mobile and could
be exercised through written notice. 3 To make this provision plain, the
face of the Option explicitly acknowledged that no party made "representations or commitments that a lease agreement concerning the property
will be entered into in the future."6 4
Within a month of entering the Option, T-Mobile filed an application
with the Gwinnett County Planning and Development Authority to place
a cell phone tower on the Penningtons' property. At T-Mobile's request,
the application was tabled more than twenty times. Also at T-Mobile's
request, the application was ultimately denied. While the application
was pending, the County amended its policies to allow the placement of
cell phone towers on county property. T-Mobile subsequently solicited
and entered a lease with the County for the placement of a cell phone
tower at a county park near the Penningtons' property. The Penningtons' Option expired. 5
The Penningtons sued, alleging inverse condemnation. The trial court
granted the County's motion for summary judgment, finding the
Penningtons had no compensable interest in any alleged cell phone lease
because T-Mobile only entered an option contract without further
obligation to act. The Penningtons appealed.6 6
The Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged that an inverse condemnation claim is valid so long as the complaining party has a valid
property interest in the property that is taken or damaged.
The
Penningtons described the thing that was taken as the "business
opportunity of leasing a portion of their property to T-Mobile for erection

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

329 Ga. App. 255, 764 S.E.2d 860 (2014).
Id. at 255, 764 S.E.2d at 860.
Id. at 255, 255-56, 256, 764 S.E.2d at 860, 861.
Id. at 256, 764 S.E.2d at 861 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257, 764 S.E.2d at 862.
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of and use of a cell phone tower.""' "A contract is not compensable
when it merely confers a contingent, future right."6 9 Because the
Penningtons only proved that a prospective business opportunity was
lost, and they merely had an expectation that T-Mobile would execute a
lease, the court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.70

These three cases are important clarifications of Georgia law and two
of the cases should be considered when filing or defending an inverse
condemnation case. Furthermore, a condemning authority should
dismiss its case well before the special master issues an award if it is
concerned about the outcome of a special master proceeding.
IV.

EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES

71

Georgia cases related to easements, covenants, and boundaries during
the past year consisted, in large part, of easement disputes resolved by
the Georgia Court of Appeals. The court of appeals tackled issues
related to access roads several times, both explicit and prescriptive. The
court of appeals also considered the nature of a restrictive covenant
created incidentally through a water services agreement and the extent
and reasonableness of a lease restriction on the operation of competing
businesses.
In Houston v. Flory,7 2 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a vague
legal description in a deed was sufficient to convey title to an easement
since a "key" was provided regarding its location. In 1998, the owner
of a ten acre tract of land divided the property into two parcels and
deeded Tract 1 to his daughter, Flory, and Tract 2 to his son, Smith.
The deed for each tract contained mutual easements over three gravel
drives located on the properties-two of which were clearly indicated on
plats referenced in the deeds, but the third gravel drive was not marked
on the plats. Each deed described the third gravel drive as extending in
an easterly direction along the land lot line from the easternmost gravel
drive depicted on the plats, and each described the beginning and ending

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Practice tip: If a condemnee seeks compensation for damages where there is no
vested legal right, a motion for summary judgement is a good tool to clarify the issues and
to potentially eliminate the claim.
71. This section was authored by Jay Buller, attorney in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Louisiana State
University (B.S., 2004); Emory University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2008). Member,
State and Federal Bars of Georgia.
72. 329 Ga. App. 882, 766 S.E.2d 227 (2014).
73. Id. at 887, 766 S.E.2d at 231.
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points. The deed for Tract 2 recited further that the third gravel drive
gave Tract 1 additional road access.7 4
In 2009, the Houstons acquired title to Tract 2 after it was foreclosed,
and their vesting deed contained the same language establishing the
easement to the third gravel drive. A dispute arose regarding the
location and enforceability of the easement to the third gravel drive, and
Flory and Smith (who occupied Tract 1) filed suit seeking a declaration
of their rights. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court
found in favor of Flory and Smith. 5
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals held there was no
dispute on appeal that the Houstons' vesting deed established an express
easement for the third gravel drive and the Houstons had actual and
constructive knowledge of the easement by virtue of the chain of title for
Tract 2." Therefore, the remaining question on appeal was whether
the description of the easement in the Houstons' deed was too vague and
indefinite to be enforced." The court noted that the description of land
does not need to be perfect to be valid and, so long as the description
provided a key, title will pass.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the
language in the deeds provided a sufficient key since it specified the
general location and direction of the easement as running along the
property lines between Tracts 1 and 2 in an easterly direction, provided
a starting point, the eastern most gravel drive as shown on the plats,
and provided an ending point, terminating within the boundaries of the
two Tracts." The undisputed extrinsic evidence further demonstrated
that the location of the third gravel drive had existed since at least 1978
and had not changed." As such, the trial court's finding that the
relevant deeds were sufficient to pass title to the easement was
affirmed."
The court of appeals then held the easement was not abandoned by
the erection of the fence across the gravel road.8 2 The residents had

74. Id. at 882-83, 883, 884, 766 S.E.2d at 228, 228-29, 229.
75. Id. at 883, 885, 766 S.E.2d at 228-29, 230. Smith had no ownership interest in
Tract 1 but occupied Tract 1 as Flory's tenant. Id. at 889-90, 766 S.E.2d at 233. Whether
Smith had standing to assert a claim was not raised in the lower court, so it was not
decided on appeal. Id. at 889, 890, 766 S.E.2d at 233.
76. Id. at 887, 766 S.E.2d at 231.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 888, 766 S.E.2d at 232.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 888-89, 766 S.E.2d at 232.
82. Id. at 889, 766 S.E.2d at 232, 233.
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testified the fence was easily unclipped and could be moved to allow
travel through the road. They further testified that they frequently used
the road and temporarily removed the fence when needed." The court
of appeals held this testimony was sufficient to maintain the easement
in light of the law's aversion to the extinguishment of easements.
Summary judgment was affirmed."
In Double Branches Ass'n v. Jones," the Georgia Court of Appeals

considered the nature of a restrictive covenant that runs with real
property.87 A homeowners association filed suit against a private water
company, claiming the water company had raised water rates and fees
in excess of the limits contained in an agreement signed by the water
company's predecessor and the developer who built the subdivision in
question. The agreement was signed in 1991 and created a structure for
water rates and fees to be charged to the subdivision residents. It
further included a ban on private wells in the area to provide exclusive
business for the water company. More than twenty years later, the
water company raised rates in excess of the agreed limits, and the
subdivision's homeowners association filed suit. 8

The water company argued that the agreement in question was a
restrictive covenant by its nature and, thus, had to be renewed every
twenty years pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b)," which requires
renewal of certain covenants in any municipality that has adopted
zoning laws, as was the case in this municipality."o The trial court
agreed with the water company and granted summary judgment.' The
court of appeals noted that not all covenants must be renewed every
twenty years, and that only those covenants that contain restrictions on
use of land by its owners require renewal." The court of appeals then
held this covenant was restrictive because it barred the residents from
This bar was particularly
obtaining water through private wells.
notable because the agreement acknowledged that the subdivision was
not serviced by a municipal or public water company; therefore, private

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
S.E.2d
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 889, 766 S.E.2d at 232.
Id. at 889, 766 S.E.2d at 232, 233.
Id. at 890, 766 S.E.2d at 233.
331 Ga. App. 159, 770 S.E.2d 252 (2015).
Id. at 160-61, 770 S.E.2d at 253.
Id. at 159-61, 770 S.E.2d at 253-54.
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b) (2010 & Supp. 2015).
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b); see also Double Branches Ass'n, 331 Ga. App. at 161, 770
at 254.
Double Branches Ass'n, 329 Ga. App. at 161, 766 S.E.2d at 254.
Id. at 163, 770 S.E.2d at 255.
Id.

204

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

water sources were needed by the residents." The restriction to
establishing private wells made the agreement a restrictive covenant
requiring renewal every twenty years. 9' Because it was not renewed,
the agreement was unenforceable. 9' The court of appeals further
rejected the argument that only the private well restriction was barred
by non-renewal." The court of appeals held the well restriction was an
integral part of the covenant because the covenant's goal was to govern
the manner in which residents accessed water generally." Thus, the
court of appeals affirmed summary judgment granted for the water
company.99
In Carnett's Properties, LLC v. JoWayne, LLC," the Georgia Court
of Appeals interpreted the intent of two parties in creating an easement
and a maintenance agreement, which governed the costs associated with
a drainage system for two parcels of land."'o Carnett's Properties, LLC
sold a 1.69 acre section of a 13.85 acre tract of land to JoWayne, LLC,
and the parties entered into a "Declaration of Joint Easement and Joint
Maintenance Agreement." The agreement provided that JoWayne would
pay Carnett 12% of the costs of maintenance, upkeep, redesign, or
improvement of a water detention facility that served the entire 13.85
acre tract. Carnett then constructed an additional retention pond and
invoiced JoWayne for 12% of the costs. JoWayne refused to pay the
costs, arguing the agreement did not cover construction of new ponds
and that the new pond did not even collect water from its portion of the
larger tract of land. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of JoWayne, concluding the agreement only applied to one detention
pond because it referred to "the" detention facility. The trial court
reasoned that because only one facility was discussed in the agreement,
JoWayne could only be forced to contribute to the maintenance or
expansion of one detention pond.10 2
However, the court of appeals focused not on the word "the" but on the
word "facility."'o The court reasoned that the agreement did not
clearly state there would only be one detention pond on the property and

94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 161, 163, 770 S.E.2d at 254, 255.
Id. at 164, 770 S.E.2d at 255.
Id.
Id. at 164, 770 S.E.2d at 255-56.
331 Ga. App. 292, 771 S.E.2d 5 (2015).
Id. at 292-93, 771 S.E.2d at 6.
Id. at 293, 771 S.E.2d at 6.
Id. at 294. 771 S.E.2d at 7.
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the ambiguity allowed for a closer examination.' The court held that
the "facility" in the agreement was not necessarily limited to one pond
and more than one detention pond could be part of the same detention
"facility."10 The court of appeals further concluded that JoWayne's
argument that water from its parcel did not drain into the new pond was
irrelevant because the agreement contemplated funding for the entire
system, and the second pond may never have been needed if water from
Jowayne's property was not running into the first pond.' 6 The court
of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for JoWayne and
remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration. 07
In Amah v. Whitefield Academy, Inc.,108 the Georgia Court of Appeals considered a grant of summary judgment in favor of Whitefield
Academy, declaring that it held an easement over a twenty-foot wide
stretch of undeveloped land along the property boundary between
Amah's and Whitefield Academy's properties.' 09 Whitefield Academy's
predecessor acquired the easement in a purchase of land from Amah's
predecessor. The easement was designed for ingress and egress. Amah
argued the easement only applied to ingress and egress for residential
purposes, not for commercial purposes, and Whitefield Academy was
using the easement for trucks, school buses, and high-volume car
traffic."o The easement stated it was to run "to and from a residence."' The trial court found that the text of the easement did not
indicate that the parties intended the easement to be limited to
residential uses and granted Whitefield Academy summary judgment. 11 2

However, the Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed."' The court of
appeals held that the trial court's construction rendered the word
"residential" superfluous and was, thus, incorrect."' The trial court
should have found an ambiguity and considered parol evidence to
attempt to resolve the dispute."' If that failed to provide a clear
intent of the parties, the trial court should have submitted the question

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 295, 771 S.E.2d at 7.
Id. at 296, 771 S.E.2d at 8.
Id.
331 Ga. App. 258, 770 S.E.2d 650 (2015).
Id. at 259, 770 S.E.2d at 652.
Id. at 260, 260-61, 770 S.E.2d at 652, 652-53.
Id. at 260, 261, 770 S.E.2d at 652, 653.
Id. at 259, 260, 770 S.E.2d at 652, 653.
Id. at 260-61, 770 S.E.2d at 653.
Id.
Id. at 261, 770 S.E.2d at 653.
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'

to a jury."' The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.-"
In Revocable Rhust of 71mothy W. Griffin v. EimberlandsHoldings Co.
Atlantic, Inc.,"' a purchaser closed an access road used by a neighboring property owner and informed the neighbor that it would deny future
access to the road. The neighbor (Timberland Holdings) sued the new
owner (Griffin), claiming that Timberland Holdings and its predecessor
had established a prescriptive easement to use the access road before
Griffin purchased its tract of land. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Timberland Holdings, affirming the existence of the
easement, and Griffin appealed.,' Griffin first argued that Timberland Holdings failed to prove the width of the access road in evidence
submitted for summary judgment.' 20 Timberland Holdings presented
evidence to show that it and its predecessor had used a twenty-foot wide
path for travel but did not show the actual width of the road itself. 2
Griffin argued the width of the area used by Timberland Holdings and
the width of the path were different issues.' 2 2
The court of appeals noted that one requirement for proving the
existence of a prescriptive easement for an access road is establishing
the width of the road itself (which cannot exceed twenty feet), not just
the width of the area used by the parties. 2 ' The court of appeals
agreed with Griffin and concluded that a determination of the actual
width of the access road in question created a question of fact for
determination by a jury.' 2 4 The court of appeals further held there
was a question of fact regarding whether the access road had shifted
during the prescriptive period.' 25 Specifically, the court of appeals
determined that possible shifts in the road over time further called into
question whether the road exceeded the twenty-foot limit in any
area.12

6

Finally, Griffin argued that Timberland Holdings failed to show
beyond a question of fact that it had kept the road in repair through the

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 262, 770 S.E.2d at 654.
328 Ga. App. 33, 761 S.E.2d 458 (2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 799 (2014).
Id. at 33-34, 34, 761 S.E.2d at 460, 460-61.
Id. at 35, 761 S.E.2d at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36, 761 S.E.2d at 462.
Id.
Id. at 37, 761 S.E.2d at 463.
Id. at 38, 761 S.E.2d at 463.
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prescriptive period.' 27 Timberland Holdings provided proof of ongoing
repairs, but the record contained testimony that the road was often in
poor condition.1 28 The court of appeals rejected Griffin's argument,
noting the repairs requirement for prescriptive easement is relevant not
for keeping the road in consistently working condition, but for the notice
repairs provided to the landowner that another party is maintaining a
road on the property. 2 ' Griffin did not argue on appeal that he had
been unaware of the ongoing repairs; thus, this argument failed. 3 0
Nonetheless, because Timberland Holdings was unable to prove the
width of the road at summary judgment, the court of appeals reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings.''
In Fab'rik Boutique, Inc. v. Shops Around Lenox, Inc.,132 a tenant
sued a landlord, claiming that a restrictive covenant in its lease was
overly broad. The lease provided that the tenant was to operate a store
called "Fab'rik" on the premises and operate as a women's clothing
boutique. The tenant was further prohibited from opening another
competing store within five miles of the first store without express
consent of the landlord. Opening another store was considered a default
under the lease. The tenant had a right to a three-year renewal if it did
not default during the first three-year term. When the tenant sought to
renew the lease, the landlord rejected the renewal and declared the
tenant in default for opening a second women's clothing boutique within
the five-mile radius. The tenant sued, alleging the radius restriction
was overly broad and invalid; thus, the tenant was not in default and
could renew the lease. The trial court found the restriction reasonable
and valid and granted summary judgment to the landlord. The tenant
appealed.' 33
The tenant argued that the radius restriction was invalid because
when the lease prohibited the tenant from opening "another store"
within five miles, it barred the opening of a store of any kind.' 3 4 The
landlord responded that the word "another" referred back to the type of
store that the tenant was required to operate under the lease-a
women's clothing boutique named Fab'rik."s

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 38-39, 761 S.E.2d at 463-64.
Id. at 39, 761 S.E.2d at 464.
Id.
329 Ga. App. 21, 763 S.E.2d 492 (2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 994 (2014).
Id. at 21-22, 763 S.E.2d at 493-94.
Id. at 22, 763 S.E.2d at 494.
Id. at 23, 763 S.E.2d at 494.
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The court of appeals held the term "another store" ambiguous and set
out to resolve the ambiguity.'"' The court reasoned that the best
reading of the lease was to read it as a whole and keep in the mind the
limited nature of the business allowed on the leased premises.'
Because the tenant was required by the lease to operate only a women's
clothing boutique named Fab'rik, the court determined that "another"
store must mean that particular type of store as well.' The narrower
reading of the radius limitation provided a fair and reasonable limit on
competing business.' 3 9 It was limited in time to the duration of the
lease and barred a limited type of commercial activity (women's boutique
clothing sales). 1 4 0 Also, the tenant had not argued that the five-mile
limit was too large in territory; rather, it merely argued that it barred
too many different types of businesses. 41 The court of appeals noted
that if the restriction had barred the tenant from opening any type of
store within the radius, it would have been clearly invalid and unenforceable, a result disfavored by the law.142 The court concluded that
because an alternative and reasonable reading was possible, the law
favored the more narrow reading of "another store."1 4 3 The court of
appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the landlord.'"
V.

FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY1 4 5

Either notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, the substantial changes
to the Federal regulations governing foreclosure throughout the country
that took effect this year, Georgia appellate courts went a bit easy on
foreclosure. However, there were a number of cases to note.
First, the Georgia Court of Appeals provided guidance on when a
lender must re-accelerate a mortgage loan prior to foreclosure. In PNC
Bank, N.A. v. Tidwell,146 a mortgage lender accelerated a note, scheduled a foreclosure sale and then postponed the sale a number of times

136. Id.
137. Id. at 23-24, 763 S.E.2d at 494-95.
138. Id. at 25, 763 S.E.2d at 496.
139. Id. at 25, 763 S.E.2d at 495-96.
140. Id. at 25, 763 S.E.2d at 496.
141. Id. at 23, 25, 763 S.E.2d at 494, 495.
142. Id. at 24, 763 S.E.2d at 495.
143. Id. at 23-24, 763 S.E.2d at 494-95.
144. Id. at 25, 763 S.E.2d at 496.
145. This section was authored by Dylan W. Howard, shareholder in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University
(B.A., 1999); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2002). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
146. 328 Ga. App. 354, 762 S.E.2d 119 (2014).
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to discuss settlement. After the bank finally foreclosed, the borrowers
sued, alleging, in part, that the agreement to postpone the foreclosure
required the bank to re-accelerate.147 The court of appeals ultimately
disagreed.`8 The court agreed with the lender that while O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-85(a)14 9 provides that withdrawal of foreclosure proceedings
reinstates the indebtedness on pre-acceleration terms, the postponement
of a foreclosure sale did not constitute withdrawal of foreclosure proceedings."" The court ultimately concluded that the lender did not take
any action that was "inconsistent with [its] intent to foreclose on the
property.""' This analysis was fact specific, however. Foreclosure
counsel continued to communicate with the borrower and advertise
successive foreclosures while settlement discussions were going on.152
Based on these actions, the court of appeals overturned the trial court's
order granting summary judgment in the borrower's favor. 5 3
Next, the Georgia courts turned to a topic that has been the subject of
frequent judicial review over the past few years: actions for confirmation
of foreclosure and actions to collect deficiency judgment after foreclosure.
In Community & Southern Bank v. DCB Investments, LLC,15 4 the
Georgia Court of Appeals again concluded that the failure to confirm a
foreclosure sale did not necessarily bar a lender from seeking to collect
on a deficiency from a guarantor.' 5 The court held, generally, that
"Georgia's appellate courts are required to construe agreements in a
manner that 'respects the parties' sacrosanct freedom of contract." 156
The court then focused on the specific language contained in the
guaranty at issue.' Notably, the guaranty included broad language
that made clear that no act would preclude enforcement against the
guarantor except the full payment of the indebtedness.5 s The guaranty also included a broad waiver of "any and all defenses, claims and

147. Id. at 355, 356, 357, 762 S.E.2d at 120-21, 122.
148. Id. at 357, 762 S.E.2d at 122.
149. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-85(a) (2002).
150. PNC Bank, N.A., 328 Ga. App. at 357, 762 S.E.2d at 122; see also O.C.G.A. § 4414-85(a).
151. PNC Bank, N.A., 328 Ga. App. at 358-59, 762 S.E.2d at 122-23 (alteration in
original) (quoting Rapps v. Cooke, 246 Ga. App. 251, 255, 540 S.E.2d 241, 244 (2000)).
152. Id. at 358-59, 762 S.E.2d at 122.
153. Id. at 359, 762 S.E.2d at 123.
154. 328 Ga. App. 605, 760 S.E.2d 210 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (July 29, 2014),
cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 53 (2015).
155. Id. at 614, 760 S.E.2d at 216.
156. Id. at 610, 760 S.E.2d at 214.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 610, 760 S.E.2d at 215.
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discharges of Borrower, or any other obligor.""' Under these circumstances, the court overturned the trial court order granting summary
60
judgment to the guarantors on this issue.o
Another case involving foreclosure confirmation is Peters v. CertusBank National Ass'n.'6 1 The Georgia Court of Appeals overturned a
trial court order granting confirmation of a foreclosure sale where the
lender failed to demonstrate that it strictly complied with the Georgia
statutory foreclosure notice requirements.'6 2 Specifically, the lender
failed to send foreclosure notice by "registered or certified mail or
This
statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested." 63
reasoning was interesting because the court refused to apply prior
decisions holding that lenders need only substantially comply with the
requirement under the same statute to identify the entity with full
authority to modify the loan.'" The court neglected to explain the
basis for the decision, except to state that the court declined to extend
its prior holdings.' 65 The decision provides a reminder to lenders and
attorneys to comply with even seemingly technical statutory requirements because the consequences of failing to do so can be dire.

VI.

SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

66

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
viable bases for standing to seek a declaration under O.C.G.A. § 9-42167 regarding rights to real property in the context of competing real
estate purchase agreements and clarified the standard for measuring
compliance with a termination provision in a real estate purchase
agreement.1 6 8 Specifically, the court held that when a claimant has its
own contractual basis for standing, the claimant may have standing to
seek a declaration regarding rights to real property, even if the

159. Id. at 612, 760 S.E.2d at 215.
160. Id. at 614, 760 S.E.2d at 216-17.
161.

329 Ga. App. 29, 763 S.E.2d 498 (2014).

162. Id. at 30, 763 S.E.2d at 500.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 31-32, 763 S.E.2d at 501.

165. Id. at 32, 763 S.E.2d at 501.
166. This section is authored by Betsy N. Burns, attorney in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest University
(B.S., magna cum laude, 2000); University of North Carolina School of Public Health
(M.P.H., 2002); University of Virginia School of Law (J.D., 2006). Member, State and
Federal Bars of Georgia and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
167. O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 (2007 & Supp. 2015).
168. See generally Del Lago Ventures, Inc. v. QuikTrip Corp., 330 Ga. App. 138, 764
S.E.2d 595 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (Nov. 24, 2014).
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declaration sought ultimately hinges on a contract to which the claimant
is not a party.16 9 The court also confirmed the general rule of substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, applies to determining
compliance with a real estate purchase agreement, including termination
provisions.' 7 0
Del Lago Ventures, Inc. v. Quik'Drip Corp."' arose out of a dispute
among competing prospective purchasers and the sellers of real property
in Cobb County, Georgia-specifically, the future site for a gas station
and convenience store (the Property). In 2010, QuikTrip Corp. (QT) and
the sellers of the Property, Ofer Bar Lev (Bar Lev) and Kofer Properties,
Inc. (collectively, Sellers), entered into a contract for purchase and sale
of the Property (the QT Contract).' 72 The QT Contract included an
inspection period and a termination provision, which permitted QT to
terminate the agreement "by written notice to [Sellers] and [Sellers']
Escrow Agent."' 7 3 QT and the Sellers amended the QT Contract
several times to extend the inspection period and set a later closing
date. 74
In July 2011, the Sellers entered into a "backup contract" with Del
Lago Ventures, Inc. (Del Lago) (the Del Lago Contract), agreeing to sell
the Property to Del Lago in the event the deal with QT fell through.17
The Del Lago Contract expressly provided that its effectiveness hinged
on QT's termination of the QT Contract "in accordance with its
On August 8, 2011, at a meeting between a QT real estate
terms."7
manager and Bar Lev for the Sellers, near the end of the QT Contract's
inspection period, Bar Lev refused to extend the QT Contract unless QT
agreed to a higher purchase price. In response, the QT real estate
manager threatened to terminate the QT Contract and left in Bar Lev's
office a termination letter he had prepared. The letter purported to
state QT's decision to terminate the purchase agreement and indicated
it had been copied to the Sellers' escrow agent. The letter, however, was
not copied to anyone and was prepared without appropriate authorization from QT, and this lack of authorization was conveyed to the Sellers

169. Id. at 142, 764 S.E.2d at 598.
170. Id.
171. 330 Ga. App. 138, 764 S.E.2d 595 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (2014).
172. Id. at 139-40, 764 S.E.2d at 597. The initial QT Contract, dated January 11, 2010,
was between only QT (buyer) and Bar Lev (seller). By a February 2010 amendment, Kofer
Properties, Inc. was added as a seller. Id. at 139, 140, 764 S.E.2d at 597.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 139-40, 764 S.E.2d at 597.
at 140-41, 142, 764 S.E.2d at 597, 598.
at 140, 764 S.E.2d at 597.
The court noted that Del Lago was a subsidiary of RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc.,

one of QT's competitors. Id. at 139, 764 S.E.2d at 596.
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later on August 8. On the evening of August 8, the Sellers informed Del
Lago about the letter left by the QT real estate manager. Del Lago
believed the QT Contract was terminated and that the Del Lago
agreement was effective. Two days after the letter incident, however,
QT and the Sellers amended the QT Contract again, extending the
inspection period, increasing the price, and providing that the Letter was
Sellers
void and that the agreement had never been terminated.
eventually conveyed the Property to QT. 17
Del Lago filed suit to enforce the Del Lago Contract and for a
declaration regarding its rights with respect to the Property based on its
assertion that the QT Contract had been terminated on August 8 by the
letter or, alternatively, that the QT Contract was void due to allegedly
forged signatures. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor
of QT, and the Sellers and Del Lago appealed.1 7 1 Considering the
issues on appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact
existed regarding whether the Letter complied with the termination
7
provision of the QT Contract.1 1
The Georgia Court of Appeals began by holding that Del Lago had
standing under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 to seek a declaration regarding the
Property because "Del Lago asserted its rights to the disputed [P]roperty
pursuant to its own contract with the Sellers."8 o In so holding, the
court circumvented QT's argument, that Del Lago lacked standing
because its declaratory claim was essentially a challenge to the QT
Contract to which Del Lago was not a party. 81 The court, however,
declined to find standing under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 to permit Del Lago to
challenge the validity of the QT Contract and held, as a result, that "Del
Lago does not have standing to challenge Kofer Properties' signatures on
the [QT] [C]ontract because Del Lago was not a party to the [QT]
[C]ontract and, therefore, cannot attack its validity."1 82
Second, QT argued that "the termination of a real estate purchase
contract requires strict compliance," and, therefore, the Letter did not
terminate the QT Contract because it was not sent to the Seller's escrow
agent (as required by the termination provision). 8 1 In essence, QT

177.
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179.
180.
181.
182.
Morris
183.

Id. at 140-41, 141, 141-42, 142, 764 S.E.2d at 597, 597-98, 598.
Id. at 139, 764 S.E.2d at 596-97.
Id. at 145, 764 S.E.2d at 600.
Id. at 142, 764 S.E.2d at 598.
Id.
Id. at 144-45, 764 S.E.2d at 600; see O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20 (Supp. 2015); see also
v. Stillwell, 257 Ga. 3, 5, 354 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1987).
Del Lago Ventures, Inc., 330 Ga. App. at 143, 764 S.E.2d at 599.
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sought to expand the circumstances requiring strict compliance with a
termination provision, which the court had previously limited to "cases
[concerning] termination notices that [result] in forfeiture of real
1 84
property rights under a lease or easement, or revocation of a surety."
The court refused to expand the previous limitation, holding that
because termination of the QT Contract "would not have resulted in the
forfeiture of real property rights under a lease or easement or the
revocation of a surety," compliance with the real estate purchase
contract's termination provision should be determined using the "general
rule . . . [ofJ substantial compliance, not strict compliance."185 The
court found material questions of fact existed on whether the Letter-and the surrounding circumstances-constituted substantial
compliance with the QT Contract's termination provision, and thus the
court held the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.18 6
VII.

TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY'

In Slivka v. Nelson,"'s the court of appeals determined that the
appellant, Gene Slivka, failed to bring a cognizable claim for an
"erroneous or illegal" tax assessment' pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5380.190 In that case, Slivka acquired a conservation use covenant for
a specific tract of land in 2004. Three years later, on June 12, 2007,
Slivka conveyed the property to a third party. After determining the
conveyance amounted to a breach of the conservation use covenant, the
McIntosh County Board of Commissioners and its tax collector (collectively, the County) assessed a penalty. Although Slivka contended there
was no breach of the covenant, the third-party purchasers paid the
penalty in full.' 91
Two years after the initial penalty was assessed, Slivka foreclosed on
a security deed he held on the property and, in 2010, he successfully
applied for a conservation use covenant on the property for a second
time. Faced with delinquent taxes due for 2008, 2009, and 2010-por-

184. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting DI Unif. Serv., Inc. v. United Water Unlimited
Atlanta LLC, 254 Ga. App. 317, 323, 562 S.E.2d 260, 265 (2002)).
185. Id. at 142, 143, 764 S.E.2d at 598, 599.
186. Id. at 143, 764 S.E.2d at 599.
187. This section is written by Amy L. Hanna, attorney in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida
(B.S., 2007); University of Florida, Levin College of Law (J.D., 2010); Executive Editor,
Florida Law Review (2009-2010). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
188. 328 Ga. App. 468, 762 S.E.2d 162 (2014), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 65 (2015).
189. Slivka, 328 Ga. App. at 468, 472, 762 S.E.2d at 163, 165.
190. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 (2010 & Supp. 2015).
191. Slivka, 328 Ga. App. at 468-69, 762 S.E.2d at 163, 164.

214

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

tions of which were assessed based upon the County's position that the
conservation use covenant had been breached-Slivka paid the past-due
taxes under protest. He then filed a complaint in the superior court,
seeking a refund pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, arguing that the
transfer of the property had not breached the original conservation use
covenant. At the trial level, the County filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing, among other things, Slivka's complaint for a refund
did not fall within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, and the trial court
agreed.' 92
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
County and relied heavily upon the trial court's reasoning.' 9 3 The
appeal turned on the distinction between a taxpayer's right to appeal an
improper tax assessment in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311194 and his right to
request a refund in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.'9' Determining that the
refund process in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 is available only to correct errors
of fact or law that have resulted in erroneous or illegal taxation, the
9
court of appeals could not find such an error in Slivka's case."'
Rather, the court of appeals determined that Slivka's assertion that the
County "did not take into account matters which [he] believes should
have been considered" was insufficient to support a claim to a refund
under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.197
In Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors v. Toro Properties VI,
LLC, 9 8 the court of appeals clarified that a court retains jurisdiction
to award litigation costs and attorney fees against the County after a
valuation judgment has been entered, even where the court did not
expressly reserve the right to do so in the judgment.'
Here, Toro
Properties VI, LLC (Toro) successfully appealed the fair market
valuation of two parcels of property in Fulton County, which resulted in
two orders from the superior court, each titled "Final Order and
Judgment Setting Value." Since the valuation set by the court was 80%
or less than the value set by the Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors
(the County), Toro also moved for the award of its litigation costs and

192. Id. at 469, 470, 762 S.E.2d at 164.
193. Id. at 472, 762 S.E.2d at 165.
194. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 (2010 & Supp. 2015).
195. Slivka, 328 Ga. App. at 470, 762 S.E.2d at 164.
196. Id. at 472, 762 S.E.2d at 165.
197. Id. (alteration in original). The court did not express an opinion on whether Slivka
retains the right to appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. 328 Ga. App. at 472 n.4, 762 S.E.2d
at 165 n.4.
198. 329 Ga. App. 26, 763 S.E.2d 496 (2014).
199. Id. at 27, 763 S.E.2d at 497.
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attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii), which the
court granted.2 00
The County did not appeal the court's valuation order, but it did
appeal the court's award of costs and fees to Toro. The County argued
that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Toro's motion for fees because
the "Final Order and Judgment Setting Value" terminated Toro's
claims. 201 However, the court of appeals disagreed and held the
express terms of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) clearly contemplate the
issuance of a fee award after the court's final determination regarding
value.20 2
In SJN Properties, LLC v. Fulton County Board of Assessors,2 03 the
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fulton
County Board of Assessors' (FCBOA) method of valuing leasehold estates
resulting from a sale-lease bond transaction.204 John Sherman argued
that the FCBOA's method of "ramping up" the estimated fair market
value of the leasehold estate each year was in violation of its statutory
and constitutional duties to ensure that ad valorem taxes are assessed
uniformly and at a fair market value. To challenge the FCBOA,
Sherman, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated Fulton
County taxpayers, filed a class action petition-which SJN Properties,
LLC later joined as an additional plaintiff-seeking declaratory,
injunctive, and mandamus relief with respect to the FCBOA's valuation
methodology.205 After discussing several procedural hurdles, including
whether sovereign immunity bars a claim for injunctive relief, the
supreme court ultimately determined the FCBOA's constitutional duty
is to "assess all taxable properties within its jurisdiction at fair market
value, utilizing the 'best information obtainable.'" 206 Comparing the
duty to the evidence presented, the court affirmed summary judgment
in favor of the FCBOA; the class simply failed to proffer any evidence
showing that the FCBOA's valuation method resulted in the actual
assessment of a leasehold property that was incorrect.20 7

200. Id. at 26, 26-27, 27, 763 S.E.2d at 496, 496-97, 497.
201. Id. at 26-27, 763 S.E.2d at 497.
202. Id. at 27, 763 S.E.2d at 497.
203. 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).
204. Id. at 801, 770 S.E.2d at 839.
205. SJN Properties,LLC, 296 Ga. at 793, 794, 795, 770 S.E.2d at 834-35.
206. Id. at 801, 770 S.E.2d at 838. The court determined, based on recent precedent,
that injunctions against the State "may proceed only where such actions are expressly
authorized under our Constitution or by a statute evincing the legislature's express intent
to permit claimants to seek injunctive relief against the State." Id. at 799, 770 S.E.2d at
837.
207. Id. at 801-02, 770 S.E.2d at 839.
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In another case involving the Fulton County Board of Assessors, the
court of appeals reversed the denial of an investment company's motion
for summary judgment on its valuation challenge.208 In CPF Invest
ments, LLLP v. Fulton County Board of Assessors,209 CPF Investments,
LLLP, (CPF) contended that, for the 2012 tax year, the County was
required by O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)21o to value the property at its 2011
sale price even though the property was purchased from the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). 2 11 The County,
however, had a presumption in place that any sale of property from
Freddie Mac did not meet the definition of "bona fide sale" because
Freddie Mac is a government agency and not a "willing seller[] acting
out of self-interest." 21 2 The trial court agreed with the County and
found the sale of the property did not qualify as an arm's length, bona
fide sale and granted the County's summary judgment motion.2 13
The court of appeals analyzed the issue differently. Instead of focusing
on whether Freddie Mac is a government agency, the court focused on
whether O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 allows the County to treat property sales
involving government entities differently.214 Finding that it did not,
the court of appeals then turned to whether the definition of a "bona fide
sale" found in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1)215 excludes a government agency
because, as the County argued, it acts in the interest of the public as
opposed to its own self-interest.2 16 Ultimately, the court could not find
any evidence that the Georgia legislature intended to exempt transactions involving a government agency from O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) and
reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.217
VIII.

TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY

2 18

Both the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals
decided several cases involving title to land during the survey period,

208. CPF Invs., LLLP v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 330 Ga. App. 744, 750, 769
S.E.2d 159, 163 (2015).
209. 330 Ga. App. 744, 769 S.E.2d 159 (2015).
210. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2010 & Supp. 2015).
211. CPFInvs., LLLP, 330 Ga. App. at 744, 769 S.E.2d at 159-60.
212. Id. at 745-46, 769 S.E.2d at 160.
213. Id. at 744, 769 S.E.2d at 160.
214. Id. at 746, 769 S.E.2d at 161.
215. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1) (2010 & Supp. 2015).
216. CPFInvs., LLLP, 330 Ga. App. at 747, 769 S.E.2d at 161.
217. Id. at 748, 750, 769 S.E.2d at 162, 163.
218. This section is written by Teresa L. Bailey, of counsel in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida
(B.A., 1983); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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dealing with, among other issues, adverse possession, the sufficiency of
legal descriptions, the delivery of deeds, quiet title, and slander of title.
In Sherman v. Thomas-Lane American Legion Post 597,219 ThomasLane American Legion Post 597 (Post 597) purchased a tract of land in
1976 without the benefit of a plat of survey. For the next thirty-five
years, Post 597 believed the western boundary of its property was a
chain-link fence located approximately fifty feet behind a concrete
building located on its property (disputed area). Post 597 claimed to
have exclusively and continuously occupied and maintained the disputed
area up to the fence line and built various structures within the disputed
area over the years. In 2009, Post 597 removed the fence because it had
fallen into disrepair. In 2011, Sherman acquired the property adjacent
to and to the west of Post 597's property. Sherman later had her
property surveyed and discovered the structures Post 597 installed in
the disputed area encroached on her land. The following year, Post 597
filed an action for declaratory judgment, claiming it had acquired title
to the disputed area by adverse possession for more than twenty years.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Post 597, and Sherman
appealed.220
The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment because
Post 597 failed to introduce evidence showing the exact location of the
fence line it claimed to be the boundary line and the evidence conflicted
regarding the distance from the back of the concrete structure to the
former location of the fence.2 2' Since there was no evidence indicating
the claimed boundary line on the survey was the same as the former
fence line, the court held that Post 597 had not met its burden of
producing evidence of the "necessary certitude."2 22
In Kelley v. Randolph,2 the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the
elements of adverse possession and prescriptive title.224 In 1987, the
Randolphs purchased their property. A strip of land behind their

219. 330 Ga. App. 618, 768 S.E.2d 797 (2015).
220. Id. at 619, 620, 619-20, 768 S.E.2d at 798. To establish title by adverse
possession, the party claiming it has the burden to show their possession is public,
continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted, and peaceable, and accompanied by a claim of right.
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161 (2010). The claim must also be in the right of the possessor and not
another, and must not have originated in fraud. Id. §§ 44-5-161(a)(1), (a)(2). Possession
ripens into title by prescription if it has been maintained for twenty years. O.C.G.A. § 445-163 (2010). If the claimant has color of title, the period is shortened to seven years.
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-164 (2010).
221. Sherman, 330 Ga. App. at 622, 768 S.E.2d at 799-800.
222. Id. at 622, 768 S.E.2d at 800.
223. 295 Ga. 721, 763 S.E.2d 858 (2014).
224. See id. at 722, 763 S.E.2d at 859.
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property was designated by plat as an alleyway, but there was no
evidence it had ever been used and there were no visible remnants. In
1990, the Randolphs constructed railroad tie terraces in their backyard. 22 5 The property adjacent to the alley and the Randolphs' property was purchased by the Kelleys in 2007. In 2011, the Kelleys discovered, for the first time, that the Randolphs' terraces and construction
debris encroached onto the alleyway and over the Kelleys' property line.
When the Randolphs refused to remove the terraces and debris, the
Kelleys brought an action, claiming trespass and seeking declaratory
judgment. In response, the Randolphs claimed they had obtained
prescriptive title to both the alleyway and a portion of Kelleys' property.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the Randolphs, and the
Kelleys appealed.226
In affirming the trial court, the supreme court held it was undisputed
that the terraces and construction debris had remained in the same
place continuously since at least 1990, which satisfied the twenty-year
prescriptive period. 22 7 The court further held the construction of the
terraces changed the nature and appearance of the property and
provided notice to all that the Randolphs were exercising possession over
the property in question.2 28 Having met their burden on all of the
required elements to prove adverse possession, the court concluded that
the Randolphs were entitled to summary judgment.229
In the case of McClattie v. Kowal, 23 0 McClattie sued her next door
neighbors, the Kowals, for trespass and encroachment. McClattie
claimed the Kowals cut tree limbs and grass on McClattie's property, the
Kowals' driveway crossed the boundary line onto McClattie's property,
the Kowals placed their trash cans in front of McClattie's property, and
the Kowals installed a small portion of a fence and a gate post over the
property line. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Kowals
on the issues of the driveway encroachment and trash can placement.
Proceeding to trial on the remaining issues, a jury found the Kowals had
acquired title to the portion of McClattie's property that had been
enclosed by Kowals' fence, and they found the Kowals had, in fact,

225. Id. at 721, 763 S.E.2d at 859.
226. Id. at 721, 721-22, 722, 763 S.E.2d at 859.
227. Id. at 722, 723, 763 S.E.2d at 859, 860.
228. Id. at 723, 763 S.E.2d at 860.
229. Id.
230. 331 Ga. App. 285, 769 S.E.2d 187 (2015), reconsiderationdenied (Mar. 19, 2015),
cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 381 (2015).
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trespassed onto McClattie's property but she was not entitled to
damages. McClattie appealed.2 3 1
The court of appeals held the directed verdicts were proper since the
portion of the driveway, which allegedly encroached, was located in the
public right of way and the trash cans were placed in the public
street.232 Because McClattie could not show she could possess the land
in question to the exclusion of others, the court found the directed
verdict for the Kowals was proper. 23 3 The court also determined the
jury's award of title to the small portion of McClattie's property enclosed
by the fence was proper because fencing is the type of possession that
would characterize an owner's use and was evidence of the Kowals'
exclusive use.2 34
In the case Johnson v. Johnson,2" 5 the court of appeals reviewed the
requirement of delivery of deeds. 23 6 The court reversed the grant of
summary judgment to the plaintiffs in a dispute over ownership of a
parcel of land, holding that the trial court erred in finding constructive
delivery of their deed. 23 7 The facts were generally undisputed. In
1993, A.B. Norman Johnson (A.B.), his wife, Ada Nell Johnson (Ada),
and their son, Michael Randy Johnson (Michael) were deeded one-third
of interests in the family home place property. A.B. also owned property
contiguous to the home place and, over the years, deeded various parcels
of this land to his children, including Michael and another son Troy
James Johnson (Troy). In 2004, an agreement was reached in which
Troy would deed three acres of the property he owned to Michael in
exchange for A.B., Ada, and Michael conveying the home place property
to Troy and his children. Neither Troy nor his children were present
when the deed to the home place was executed. Sometime after the deed
was executed, Michael brought the deed to Troy's home in an envelope
and represented to Troy and A.B., who was present, that the deed had
been recorded, which was not true. Michael gave the deed to A.B., who
then placed the deed in the trunk of his car. A.B. did not remove the
deed from the envelope, show Troy the deed, or hand the deed to Troy
before placing it in the trunk of his car. A.B. told Troy that he was

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

331 Ga. App. at 285, 769 S.E.2d at 188-89.
Id. at 285-86, 769 S.E.2d at 189.
Id. at 285, 769 S.E.2d at 189.
Id. at 286, 769 S.E.2d at 189.
327 Ga. App. 604, 760 S.E.2d 618 (2014).
Id. at 606, 760 S.E.2d at 620.
Id.
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leaving the deed in his car and that he was leaving the car to Troy in his
will, which is where he could find the deed."
In 2006 and 2007, Michael, A.B., and Ada each executed and recorded
deeds conveying their interest in the home place to family members
other than Troy and his children, and the grantees of these deeds
further conveyed the property to various other family members. Troy
was aware of these conveyances, but he believed they were all without
effect because he thought his deed had been recorded first. It was not
until A.B.'s death in 2009 and Troy's retrieval of his deed from the trunk
of A.B.'s car that Troy realized his deed had not been recorded.2 3 9
In 2010, Troy filed a complaint in equity to set aside the 2006 and
2007 deeds. 2 40 The grantees of the various other deeds answered and
counterclaimed to remove the cloud on their title caused by the 2004
deed. Troy claimed there was legal delivery of the 2004 deed before the
execution and recording of the 2006 and 2007 deeds. The grantees
claimed that A.B. had retained control of the deed until his death in
2009, and that Troy's deed had not been delivered and did not pass
title.24 1
Well-settled law in Georgia provides that the execution of a deed
without delivery is insufficient to pass title and that the delivery must
occur during the lifetime of the grantor.2 42 To establish legal delivery,
the grantor's intent to deprive himself of power and control over the deed
must be shown.243 Where the grantor has preserved the opportunity
to change his mind, to undo what has been done, or to withdraw from an
incomplete action, delivery has not been completed.244
It was undisputed that Troy's deed was placed in A.B.'s car, which
remained in A.B.'s possession and control until his death, and that Troy
could have retrieved the deed from the trunk at any time.24 5 Troy also
testified that A.B. could have retrieved the deed from the trunk and torn
it up if he had been so inclined.2 4 6 While A.B. did not destroy the
deed, he did subsequently convey the property to other family members,
indicating he had changed his mind about conveying the property to

238.
239.
240.
at 620.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 604-05, 605, 760 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 605, 760 S.E.2d at 619.
Troy also sought to set aside the subsequent conveyances. Id. at 605, 760 S.E.2d
Id. at 605, 606, 760 S.E.2d at 620.
See Robinson v. Williams, 280 Ga. 877, 879, 635 S.E.2d 120, 122 (2006).
Stinson v. Woodland Bank, 154 Ga. 254, 257, 114 S.E.2d 181, 182 (1922).
Morris v. Johnson, 219 Ga. 81, 89, 132 S.E.2d 45, 51-52 (1963).
Johnson, 327 Ga. App. at 607, 760 S.E.2d at 620.
Id.
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Troy.24 7 Accordingly, the court held the 2004 deed had not been
delivered at the time it was placed in the trunk, or thereafter during the
life of A.B., and the appellants should have been granted summary
judgment.2 48
In Stearns Bank, N.A. v. Dozetos, 249 Keith Dozetos (Keith) and Lori
Dozetos (Lori) filed suit against his mother, Bea Nickelson (Nickelson),
and others to quiet title to a fourteen acre tract of land. Nickelson
answered, counterclaimed, and crossclaimed that she held title to the
property.25 o The undisputed facts revealed Keith acquired title to the
property in 1998 and, in 2002, conveyed the property to his mother by
quit claim deed in return for a loan of at least $8000. Keith contended
that within a year and a half he had repaid the loan, but his mother
refused to reconvey the property to him. Nickelson claimed Keith had
borrowed another $38,000 from her, which had not been repaid and was
secured by the property. Keith forged a quit claim deed conveying the
property from Nickelson to Lori because Nickelson refused to reconvey
the property to him. Lori, in turn, conveyed the property to a builder,
who then used the property as collateral for a construction loan.25 1
The trial court found that because Keith had forged the quit claim
deed, Nickelson was the title holder and the Bank's lien against the
property was invalid since neither Lori nor the contractor had any
interest in the property that they could convey. The court began by
noting that it is settled law in Georgia that a forged deed will not convey
good title to the grantee nor anyone holding under the grantee, including
a bona fide purchaser for value.252 However, the Bank claimed the
forged deed should not have ended the inquiry and the trial court should
have construed the quit claim deed establishing Nickelson's title as a
security deed and not as an absolute conveyance.253 The court of
appeals agreed with the Bank.2 5 4
Since it was undisputed that Nickelson never took possession of the
property, the Bank and the Dozetos were entitled to introduce, by parol

247. Id.
248. Id. at 607, 760 S.E.2d at 620-21.
249. 328 Ga. App. 106, 761 S.E.2d 520 (2014).
250. The other respondents to the quiet title case were the contractor to whom a quit
claim deed had been given to permit him to obtain a construction loan to build a home for
the Dozetos on the property, and the successor to the lender providing the financing to the
contractor, Stearns Bank. Id. at 106, 761 S.E.2d at 521.
251. Id. at 106, 107, 761 S.E.2d at 521, 522.
252. Id. at 107, 108, 761 S.E.2d at 521, 522 (citing Tate v. Potter, 216 Ga. 750, 752, 119
S.E.2d 547, 548 (1961)).
253. Id. at 108, 761 S.E.2d at 522.
254. Id. at 109, 761 S.E.2d at 523.
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evidence, that the quit claim deed vesting title in Nickelson was a
mortgage only.' 5 It was not disputed that both Nickelson and Keith
understood the quit claim he issued to her was to secure repayment of
a loan and, once the debt was repaid, title would be returned to
Keith. 256 The court of appeals reversed the trial court and remanded
the case for the trial court to decide the amount of the secured debt owed
to Nickelson and whether the debt had been fully paid.25 7
The case of Thompson v. Blackwell... required the supreme court to
analyze what appeared to be conflicting provisions in a will concerning
the disposition of real property.259 The undisputed facts showed that
Hodge King (Mr. King) and his wife, Hattie King (Mrs. King), owned
four tracts of real property as tenants in common. In his will, Mr. King
left all of his property of whatever kind to his wife, in fee simple, upon
his death. 260 Later in the same will, Mr. King left all of his interest
in the four tracts to his son and his son's children "[u]pon the death of
my said wife."26 1 Mr. King died in 1999. Mrs. King died in 2012,
leaving her own will purporting to devise one of the four tracts to Mr.
King's son in fee simple, and the other three tracts to her nieces. When
the nieces attempted to convey one of the three tracts, they discovered
the discrepancy in Mr. King's will and filed a petition to quiet title
against Mr. King's grandchildren. The matter was referred to a Special
Master, who found in favor of the nieces that title to all four tracts had
passed to Mrs. King. The Special Master report was adopted by the trial
court, and the grandchildren appealed.262
The primary issue to be determined on appeal was whether Mr. King
intended to convey a fee simple estate to his wife or whether he intended
to convey only a life estate to her with the remainder to his son and
grandchildren. 263 The court focused on the language "upon the death
of my said wife" in the will. 26 4 The court found that the word "upon"
indicated an event the testator knew was certain to happen and
specifically stated how the property in question would be devised "upon
the death" of his wife.2 65 The court distinguished this language from

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 109, 761 S.E.2d at 522.
Id. at 108-09, 761 S.E.2d at 522-23.
Id. at 109-10, 761 S.E.2d at 523-524.
296 Ga. 443, 769 S.E.2d 46 (2015).
Id. at 443, 769 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 443-44, 769 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 444, 769 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 443, 444-45, 769 S.E.2d at 47, 48.
Id. at 445, 769 S.E.2d at 48.
Id. at 444, 445, 769 S.E.2d at 47, 48.
Id. at 446-47, 769 S.E.2d at 49.
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language used in wills intended to create a contingency; namely, "if' or
"then."266 Since Mr. King used the word "upon," it could not be said
that Mr. King meant to devise the property to his son and grandchildren
only if Mrs. King predeceased Mr. King.267 In so holding, the court
determined the plain language of Mr. King's will indicated that he
intended to grant Mrs. King only a life estate in the four tracts with the
remainder to be given to his son and grandchildren, and the court, as a
result, reversed the trial court. 26
In DOCO Credit Union v. Chambers," William Chambers (Bill), son
of Ida Chambers and husband of Cheryl Chambers, executed a series of
promissory notes in favor of DOCO Credit Union (DOCO), totaling over
$1.5 million. The promissory notes were secured by various pieces of
property located in Crisp and Lee Counties and, depending on ownership, security deeds were purportedly executed by Ida Chambers,
individually or as the executrix of her late husband's estate, and by Bill,
individually or as trustee for various trusts. Bill defaulted on the loans,
and DOCO obtained judgment against him for the outstanding balance
and foreclosed on the properties located in Lee County. After foreclosure, Cheryl Chambers gave notice to DOCO, claiming Bill had breached
his fiduciary duty to the various trusts by encumbering the properties
owned by the trusts and DOCO had aided and assisted in the breach.
Cheryl Chambers demanded return of the properties and compensation
for damages. Thereafter, Ida Chambers and Cheryl Chambers (collectively, Chambers) filed suit in Dougherty County against DOCO, seeking
damages for wrongful foreclosure and various other claims, including
aiding in breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and civil RICO, but
Chambers did not seek to set aside the foreclosures.2 7 0
Notwithstanding the law suit pending in Dougherty County, a quiet
title action was filed by DOCO in Lee County against Chambers to
establish DOCO had legal title to the Lee County properties it had
acquired through foreclosure. Chambers filed a motion to dismiss and
plea in abatement, claiming that DOCO's quiet title action was barred
by the pending action in Dougherty County. The trial court granted
Chambers' motion to dismiss, and DOCO appealed.2 7 1

266.
267.
of time,
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id. at 447, 769 S.E.2d at 49. The court found the word "upon" to be "an adverb
and not of contingency." Id.
Id.
330 Ga. App. 633, 768 S.E.2d 808 (2015).
Id. at 634-35, 768 S.E.2d at 809-10.
Id. at 635, 636, 768 S.E.2d at 810.
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The question before the court of appeals was whether the prior
pending action rule applied and acted as a bar to DOCO's second
suit. 2 7 2 The court reviewed the Chambers suit, ruling it was based in
tort law since Chambers sought damages for the alleged wrongful
foreclosures and did not seek return of the properties.7
In the quiet
title case, DOCO sought to conclusively establish its title to the
properties located in Lee County.27 4 By statute, quiet title cases must
be brought in the county where the property at issue is situated. 27 5
The court determined the two causes of action were neither identical nor
resolving of the same issues.276 Furthermore, the court concluded that
the quiet title case sought to establish title to properties in Lee County
while the Chambers suit sought to hold DOCO monetarily responsible
for the alleged unlawful acquisition of title to those and other properties.2 7 7 In addition, since the quiet title action was required to be
brought in Lee County, the court concluded the Dougherty County
Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition.27 8 It was,
therefore, error for the Lee County Superior Court to dismiss the quiet
title action, and the court of appeals reversed the trial court. 27 9
In the case Veatch v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 28 0 Veatch, in prior
litigation, had successfully established that someone had forged deeds
transferring title to property and used the property to secure a loan.
Although Aurora Loan Services, LLC (Aurora) was not originally a party
to the prior suit, it was added as a defendant. On April 9, 2009, nine
days after being added as a defendant, Aurora, with the assistance of the
law firm McCalla Raymer, recorded an assignment of the secured party's
interest in the loan.2 81
At the conclusion of the prior litigation, Veatch filed suit against
Aurora and McCalla Raymer, alleging the recording of the assignment
slandered title to the property. Veatch claimed he was unable to convey
clear title to the property from the date the erroneous security deed was

272. Id. at 636 & n.6, 768 S.E.2d at 810 & n.6. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-44(a) provides, "[T]he
pendency of a former action for the same cause of action between the same parties in the
same or any other court having jurisdiction shall be a good cause of abatement." O.C.G.A.
§ 9-2-44(a) (2007).
273. Chambers, 330 Ga. App. at 636-37, 768 S.E.2d at 811.
274. Id. at 637, 768 S.E.2d at 811.
275. See O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62(a) (1982).
276. Chambers, 330 Ga. App. at 637, 768 S.E.2d at 811.
277. Id. at 637-38, 768 S.E.2d at 812.
278. Id. at 638, 768 S.E.2d at 812.
279. Id.
280. 331 Ga. App. 597, 771 S.E.2d 241 (2015).
281. Id. at 597, 599, 771 S.E.2d at 242.
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filed of record (2007) through the date the supreme court ruled in the
prior litigation (2011) and Aurora and McCalla Raymer should be liable
for the loss in value of the property during that time. Veatch claimed
damages as the difference between the amount of the loan obtained
using the forged deeds, $187,500, and the amount he obtained when he
sold the property, $18,000. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Aurora and McCalla Raymer, and Veatch appealed. 28 2
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals focused on Veatch's
failure to raise an issue of fact regarding special damages.'
The
court reiterated that a plaintiff asserting slander of title is entitled to
"only such special damages as he actually sustained as a consequence of
the wrongful acts, which damages must be pled and proven with
particularity." 284 In addition, the court noted the cause of action
accrues at the time the slander is first published.285 Therefore, the
court found the correct time frame for assessing damages ran from the
date the assignment was recorded (2009) through the date of the
supreme court decision (2011) and the amount of the loan obtained in
2007 was not relevant to the determination of damages. 286 No evidence of the value of the property was introduced for the time frame
from 2009 through 2011, and Veatch failed to show how the value of the
property during that period suffered after the assignment was recorded.2 87 Having failed to plead and prove special damages caused by the
filing of the erroneous assignment, the court concluded that summary
judgment in favor of appellants was proper.288
Similarly, in Seaboard Construction Co. v. Kent Realty Brunswick,
LLC,28 9 the court of appeals held the failure to plead and prove special
damages was fatal to a slander of title claim.2 90 In Seaboard, Kent
Realty of Brunswick, LLC (Kent) owned two of five properties against
which Seaboard Construction Co. (Seaboard) filed materialman's liens
for unpaid construction work. The total amount claimed by Seaboard
was $363,959.81, but Seaboard filed its claim of lien for the total amount
in each of the five liens filed. 9
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Id. (quoting Sanders v. Brown, 257 Ga. App. 566, 568, 571 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2002)).
Id. at 601, 771 S.E.2d at 244.
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Id. at 601-02, 771 S.E.2d at 245.
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Id. at 744, 771 S.E.2d at 431.
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Kent filed suit for slander of title, and the parties filed cross motions
for summary judgment. The trial court granted Kent's motion, finding
the liens to be invalid because the amount of the liens against Kent's
properties violated the statutory limitation. 2 With regard to Kent's
properties, the trial court found the lien amount should have been for
the amount of the contract relative to those properties only and not the
total amount. The trial court further ruled that a jury issue remained
on Kent's slander of title claim."'
The court of appeals agreed that the liens filed by Seaboard against
Kent's property violated the statute and were, therefore, invalid.9
But the court reversed on the issue that a jury should decide the slander
of title claim because Kent offered no evidence of special damages."'
Although Kent had argued that it was unable to get a loan as a result
of the liens, there was no evidence by affidavit or otherwise in the record
to support Kent's claim, and there was no evidence linking the failure
to get a loan to the filing of the invalid liens.296 Accordingly, the trial
court erred in preserving the issue and should have granted summary
judgment in favor of Seaboard."
IX.

298
TRESPASS AND NUISANCE

Over the past year, the trespass and nuisance decisions by the Georgia
Court of Appeals focused on inverse condemnation claims made by
individuals against counties. The emphasis of these claims seems to
center on the continuing nature of the alleged nuisances.
299
the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed
In Liberty County v. Eller,
the trial court's denial of a county's motions for summary judgment.0 o
The appeal stemmed from an action filed by the Ellers against Liberty

292. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1 provides that "[iun no event shall the aggregate amount of
liens set up by Code Section 44-14-361 exceed the contract price of the improvements made
or services performed." O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1 (2002 & Supp. 2015).
293. 331 Ga. App. at 742-43, 771 S.E.2d at 430. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(e) provides that
"[iln no event shall the aggregate amount of liens set up by Code Section 44-14-361 exceed
the contract price of the improvements made or services performed." O.C.G.A. § 44-14361.1(e).
294. Seaboard, 331 Ga. App. at 743-44, 771 S.E.2d at 431.
295. Id. at 744, 771 S.E.2d at 431.
296. Id. at 744-45, 771 S.E.2d at 431.
297. Id. at 745, 771 S.E.2d at 431.
298. This section was authored by Montoya McGee Ho-Sang, attorney in the law firm
of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Dillard
University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2004); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
299. 327 Ga. App. 770, 761 S.E.2d 164(2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 695 (2014).
300. Id. at 770, 761 S.E.2d at 166.
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County (the County) for trespass, continuing trespass, nuisance, inverse
condemnation, and damages based on a drainage pipe that discharged
storm water run-off into a pond on the Ellers' property. The County
filed motions for summary judgment in the trial court, arguing the
statute of limitations had run on the inverse condemnation claim and
the other claims were barred by sovereign immunity."o'
The County maintained that sovereign immunity barred the Ellers'
claims for trespass, continuing trespass, tortious interference with
contractual relations, adverse impact on credit rating, emotional
damages, and litigation expenses.302 The court of appeals opined that
any claims outside of trespass, nuisance, or inverse condemnation were
barred by sovereign immunity."o' The court noted that counties can
be liable for conditions on private property under the constitutional
eminent domain provisions against taking or damaging the property
without just and adequate compensation. 30 4 However, counties, unlike
municipalities, are not generally liable for creating nuisances unless the
30
nuisance rises to the level of a taking for inverse condemnation.o
The court further determined that if the Ellers had stated a viable claim
for inverse condemnation, nuisance, or trespass that rose to the level of
a taking, then it followed that the County had waived sovereign
immunity.3

06

Ultimately, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in
denying the County's motion for summary judgment because the Ellers'
claim of inverse condemnation was barred by the four year statute of
limitations.3 0 ' The court also found that the Ellers did not establish a
A continuing nuisance can be established
continuing nuisance. 0
through evidence that an existing condition, such as a culvert or
drainpipe, was inadequately maintained.0 9 In reviewing the record
in the light most favorable to the Ellers, the court did not find any
support for a claim of improper maintenance of the drain pipe; thus, the
Ellers' claim had to be one for a permanent nuisance.3 " The court
went on to explain that "[a] claim for a permanent nuisance is not
barred if some new harm that was not previously observable occurred

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

771, 761 S.E.2d at 167.
771-72, 761 S.E.2d at 167.
772, 761 S.E.2d at 167.
774, 761 S.E.2d at 168-69.
772, 761 S.E.2d at 167-68.
773, 761 S.E.2d at 168.
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within the four years preceding the filing of their cause of action.""n
To the extent the Ellers alleged a claim for permanent nuisance based
on the installation of the drainage pipe in 2001, the court opined that
312
As a
their claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitation.
result, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the
County's motions for summary judgment."'
In July 2014, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to the county defendants in Davis v.
Effingham County Board of Commissioners,314 ruling that a claim for
continuing nuisance did not lie."' The Davises brought an action
against Effingham County Board of Commissioners, Sheriff Jimmy
McDuffie, Deputy Gary Provost (the county defendants), two private
contractors, and one of their employees for damages allegedly suffered
when Mr. Davis' truck hit a pothole on a county-maintained road. The
Davises alleged a nuisance claim against the Board of Commissioners
and the Sheriff in his official capacity.3 1 6 The court of appeals noted,
"A county may be liable to an owner in damages to property, either real
or personal, through inverse condemnation by a nuisance created,
maintained, or worsened by [the] county."' The Davises conceded
this exception was limited to property damages and did not extend to
personal injuries.318 The court explained that in considering property
damage allegedly caused by a nuisance, "a county must perform a
continuous or regularly repetitious act, or create a continuous or
1
regularly repetitious condition that caused the harm." ' Therefore, "a
32 0
single act of negligence is insufficient."
In their complaint, the Davises alleged a pothole appeared in an
existing roadway without the direct intervention of any defendant and,
32 1
as a result, Mr. Davis' truck hit the pothole, which caused damage.
The court determined that the allegations consisted of a single, isolated

311. Id. at 773-74, 761 S.E.2d at 168 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oglethorpe
Power Corp. v. Forrester, 289 Ga. 331, 336, 711 S.E.2d 641, 645 (2011)).
312. Id. at 774, 761 S.E.2d at 168.
313. Id. at 774, 761 S.E.2d at 169.
314. 328 Ga. App. 579, 760 S.E.2d 9 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (July 29, 2014), cert.
denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 22 (2015).
315. Id. at 579-80, 760 S.E.2d at 11.
316. Id. at 579, 580, 760 S.E.2d at 11.
317. Id. at 582, 760 S.E.2d at 12.
318. Id. at 583, 760 S.E.2d at 13.
319. Id. (quoting David v. Effingham Cnty. Bd. of Commrs., 328 Ga. App. 579, 583, 760
S.E.2d 9, 13 (2014)), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 22 (2015).
320. Id. (quoting Davis, 328 Ga. App. at 583, 760 S.E.2d at 13).
321. Id. at 584, 760 S.E.2d at 13.
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occurrence, which did not amount to a nuisance or inverse condemnation
of Mr. Davis' truck for a public purpose.' Thus, the trial court did
not err in granting summary judgment to the County defendants on the
Davises' claims for inverse condemnation and nuisance.2
X.

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

3 24

This survey term saw the continuation of a number of important
developments concerning the unauthorized practice of law. 325 These
developments focused on the issue of witness-only closings.
"'Witness-only closings' occur when notaries, signing agents and other
individuals who are not a party to the real estate closing preside 'over
the execution of the deeds of conveyance and other closing documents,
but purport to do so merely as a witness and notary, not as someone
who is practicing law.'"02 6
Both the federal and state courts issued recent opinions that addressed
this issue.
In March and April of 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit decided two cases that presented the issue of whether
a borrower's payment of attorney fees charged for the alleged unauthorized practice of law violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act
(RESPA).32 7 In order to state a claim for violation of section 8(b) of
RESPA,3 2 8 a plaintiff must allege that a defendant received fees in
3 29
Where the
exchange for providing no, nominal, or duplicative work.
30
fee is for services actually rendered, there is no violation of RESPA.o

322. Id.
323. Id.
324. This section was authored by Scott H. Michalove, of counsel in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Syracuse
Univeristy (A.B., 1984); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1995).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
325. The history and recent opinions of the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the
unauthorized practice of law in real estate closings was discussed in prior Georgia Real
Property Law Surveys. See generally Finley, supranote 1, at 181-87; Linda S. Finley, Real
Property, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L . REV. 255, 257 (2012).
326. In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. 472, 473 n.3, 588 S.E.2d 741, 742 n.3
(2003) (quoting UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2), reconsiderationdenied (Dec. 12, 2008).
327. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2012).
328. 12 U.S.C. 2607(b) (2012).
329. Clements v. LSI Title Agency, Inc., 779 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015);
Wesolowski v. Title Source, Inc., 608 F. App'x 724 (11th Cir. 2015).
330. Wesolowski, 608 F. App'x at 725; see 12 U.S.C. § 2607(1) (2012); see also 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024.14(g)(I) (2015).
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In Clements v. LSI Title Agency, Inc.' and Wesolowski v. Title
Source, Inc.,332 the plaintiffs alleged the services provided by the
defendants constituted the unauthorized practice of law and, thus, could
not be "services actually performed" as defined by RESPA.3 1 In
reviewing the district court's orders granting defendants' motions to
dismiss, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, holding that
"[w]here the fee is for services actually rendered, there is no § 2607(b)
violation . . . even where the services provided violated state law."3 3 4
The court in both Clements and Wesolowski held that the plaintiffs'
allegations regarding the unauthorized practice of law failed to state a
claim for violation of RESPA against all but one of the defendants in
those cases."'
In December 2013, the State Bar of Georgia published Formal
Advisory Opinion 13-1 (FAO 13-1),336 a revised formal advisory opinion
addressing the issue of witness-only closings.3 3 1 In FAO 13-1, the State
Bar explicitly stated, "A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a 'witness
only' closing."3 3" The State Bar noted that "when a closing Lawyer
purports to act merely as a witness, this is a misrepresentation of the
Lawyer's role in the transaction," and Georgia Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.4(a)(4) 339 is violated.3 4 0 As noted in last year's survey, 341
FAO 13-1 modifies the position taken by the State Bar in UPL Advisory
Opinion No. 2003-2,342 which stated that a Georgia lawyer who
conducts a witness-only closing did not engage in the unauthorized

331. 779 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2015).
332. 608 F. App'x 724 (11th Cir. 2015).
333. Clements, 779 F.3d at 1274; Wesolowski, 608 F. App'x at 725.
334. Wesolowski, 608 F. App'x at 725-26; see also Clements, 779 F.3d at 1274-75.
335. See Clements, 779 F.3d at 1275; Wesolowski, 608 F. App'x at 726. The court in
Wesolowski reversed the district court's order granting a motion to dismiss for one
defendant because the district court relied on documents attached to the defendant's
pleadings to demonstrate the defendant performed services in connection with the closing
at issue. 608 F. App'x at 726.
336. Second Publication of Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-R2 [hereinafter
known as "FormalAdvisory Opinion No. 13-1," GA. B.J. 73, 73 (Dec. 2013)].
337. Id.
338. In re Formal Advisory Opinion No. 13-1, 295 Ga. 749, 750, 763 S.E.2d 875, 875
(2014) [hereinafter FAO 13-1].
339. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(4) (2015).
340. FAO 13-1, 295 Ga. at 751, 763 S.E.2d at 876.
341. See Linda S. Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 66 MERCER L.
REV. 151, 183 (2014).
342. UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 (Ga. Bar Apr. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=542 (last visited Sept. 30,
2015).
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practice of law.3 4 3 UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 allowed Georgia
licensed attorneys to perform witness-only closings.344 In contrast,
FAQ 13-1 prohibits Georgia licensed attorneys from doing So.
In January 2014, the State Bar submitted FAO 13-1 to the Georgia
Supreme Court for review.34 6 Many commentators, including this
author, had hoped the Georgia Supreme Court would clarify the
apparent conflict between FAQ 13-1 and UPL Advisory Opinion No.
2003-2. However, on September 22, 2014, the Georgia Supreme Court
issued a one paragraph opinion adopting FAO 13-1, which did not
address this issue.34 7 As demonstrated by the Clements and Wesolowski cases, the ambiguities in this area of the law will likely lead to
further litigation on these issues.
XI.

ZONING...

In Newton County v. East Georgia Land & Development Co.,34 the
Georgia Supreme Court considered whether the superior court erred in
finding that a zoning ordinance in Newton County, Georgia, that
incorporated a set of yet-to-be-created maps was void and unenforceable.' The zoning ordinance, adopted on May 21, 1985, based certain
zoning classifications solely on references to "Official Zoning District
Maps" for the county. Without the "Official Zoning District Maps," it
was impossible to determine the applicable classification for any
property. The "Official Zoning District Maps," however, were not
31
adopted until July 2, 1985, over forty days after the ordinance itself.

343. Id.
344. Id.
345. FAO 13-1, 295 Ga. at 751,763 S.E.2d at 876.
346. Id. at 749, 763 S.E.2d at 875.
347. Id.
348. This section was authored by Joann E. Johnston, attorney in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of South
Carolina (B.A. & B.S., magna cum laude, 2001); Emory University School of Law (J.D.,
with honors, 2004). Member, State Bars of Georgia and South Carolina.
349. 296 Ga. 18, 764 S.E.2d 830 (2014). This was the third appeal to the Georgia
Supreme Court involving the Newton County ordinance. Id. at 18, 764 S.E.2d at 830-31.
See E. Georgia Land & Dev. Co. v. Baker, 286 Ga. 551, 552, 690 S.E.2d 145, 147 (2010)
[hereinafter E. Georgia Land & Dev. 11; E. Georgia Land & Dev. Co. v. Newton Cnty., 290
Ga. 732, 732, 723 S.E.2d 909, 909-10 (2012) [hereinafter E. Georgia Land Dev. ll].
350. E. Georgia Land & Dev., 296 Ga. at 18, 764 S.E.2d at 831.
351. Id. at 18-19, 764 S.E.2d at 831-32. The County argued the 1985 ordinance was
valid because the maps the County had adopted in 1971, with an earlier ordinance, were
still in existence on May 21, 1985. Id. at 18-19 & 19 n.2, 764 S.E.2d at 831-32 & 832 n.2.
The supreme court rejected this assertion, finding nothing in the record indicated that the
1971 maps were designated "Official Zoning District Maps" for Newton County. Id.
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In considering whether the Newton County ordinance properly
incorporated the "Official Zoning District Maps," the supreme court
referenced two existing precedents, which rejected "the principle of
incorporation by reference can apply prospectively to a document which
has yet to be filed or made a public record . . . ."
The supreme court
further noted that an ordinance must meet four criteria to properly
incorporate a map or other document:
(1) The document must be sufficiently identified so that there is no
uncertainty as to what was adopted. (2) The document must be made
a public record. (3) It must be accessible to members of the public who
are, or may be, affected by it. (4) The adopting resolution must give
notice of this accessibility.53

'

The supreme court concluded that the "Official Zoning District Maps"
were an essential part of the zoning ordinance and because they did not
exist on May 21, 1985, they could not have been part of the public record
or accessible to members of the public.35 4 As a result, the supreme
court agreed with the superior court that the Newton County ordinance
incorporating the "Official Zoning District Maps" was void from its
enactment.35 5
The supreme court also held the subsequent adoption of the "Official
Zoning District Maps" did "nothing to revive the invalid ordinance of
May 21, 1985."'" The court noted that Newton County had the
opportunity to fix the invalid ordinance but failed to do so. 3 " A void
zoning ordinance can be revived only if it is formally reenacted.'"
Newton County, however, did not reenact the original ordinance when
it approved the "Official Zoning District Maps" on July 2, 1985 or any
time thereafter.35 9 Nor did Newton County incorporate the adopted
"Official Zoning District Maps" into any other existing ordinance."o
As a result, the supreme court affirmed the superior court's ruling that
the zoning ordinance was void from its enactment and unenforceable by
Newton County.36

352.

Id. at 19, 764 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting McKee v. City of Geneva, 280 Ga. 411, 412-

13, 627 S.E.2d 555, 557 (2006)).
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id. (quoting E. Georgia Land & Dev. II, 290 Ga. at 737, 723 S.E.2d at 913).
Id.
Id. at 20, 764 S.E.2d at 832.
Id. at 20, 764 S.E.2d at 833.
Id. at 20, 764 S.E.2d at 832-33.
Id. at 20, 764 S.E.2d at 833.
Id. at 20, 764 S.E.2d at 832.
Id.
Id. at 21, 764 S.E.2d at 833.
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In Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Buckler,362 a civic association appealed
a superior court order dismissing its petition for certiorari review of the
DeKalb County Planning Commission's approval of a subdivision sketch
plat.' The developer filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing,
for the first time, that the civic association lacked standing under the
"substantial interest-aggrieved citizen test" for cases involving zoning
decisions. 3" Under this test, a person has a "substantial interest" in
a zoning decision when they suffer "some special damages" that are "not
common to other property owners similarly situated" and, as such, have
an "interest 'more than merely that of a taxpayer. . . seeking to have a
strict enforcement of zoning regulations for the benefit of the general
The
welfare . . . or general enhancement of property values.'""'
superior court agreed that the civic association did not have standing
and dismissed the petition, and the association appealed."'
Before analyzing whether the association members met these criteria,
however, the Georgia Court of Appeals first reviewed whether the
superior court should have considered the developer's standing argument
at all given the developer did not raise the argument before the Planning
Commission.36 7 Georgia law is clear that "[a]s a general rule, standing
must be determined at the time at which the plaintiff's complaint is filed
. .
"3" Accordingly, when a party files a petition for certiorari review
of an administrative body's decision, standing objections not raised
before that body can be waived."'
To determine whether the developer waived its standing objection by
not first raising the issue before the Planning Commission, the Georgia
Court of Appeals considered whether the Planning Commission's
approval of the developer's subdivision sketch plat constituted a "zoning
decision."3 7 0 The court of appeals noted that "zoning power, vested in

362. 328 Ga. App. 485, 760 S.E.2d 194 (2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 867 (2014),
cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 869 (2014). This was the fourth appeal to the Georgia Court
of Appeals regarding this decision by the DeKalb County Planning Commission. Id. at 48586, 760 S.E.2d at 196-97; see Buckler v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 299 Ga. App. 465,
683 S.E.2d 22 (2009); Buckler v. DeKalb Cnty., 290 Ga. App. 190, 659 S.E.2d 398 (2008);
DeKalb Cnty. v. Buckler, 288 Ga. App. 346, 654 S.E.2d 193 (2007).
363. Buckler, 328 Ga. App. at 485-86, 760 S.E.2d at 196.
364. Id. at 487, 491, 760 S.E.2d at 197, 200.
365. Id. at 491, 760 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta Merch. Mart, 101
Ga. App. 163, 163, 112 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1960)).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 491-92, 760 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting Perdue v. Lake, 282 Ga. 348, 348, 647
S.E.2d 6, 7 (2007)).
369. Id. at 492, 760 S.E.2d at 200.
370. Id.
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the county governing authority, is legislative . . . and reviewed with
great deference.", 7 ' Rezoning appeals, for example, constitute legislative action.3 7 2 On the other hand, the court of appeals noted some
administrative actions, such as decisions regarding whether to grant or
deny a zoning variance or permit, are considered "quasi-judicial" actions
because the administrative body's decisions are "tightly controlled by the
ordinance.""
The court of appeals described the standard of review for each type of
action controls when a party must raise standing to avoid waiving the
argument.3 " Review of a legislative action, for example, permits
parties to introduce new evidence to the superior court and, similarly,
raise standing objections that may not have been asserted before the
administrative body.3 7' Review of a quasi-judicial action, on the other
hand, is bound by the evidence submitted to the administrative body
such that the parties may not subsequently produce new evidence or
assert standing objections. 7
To determine whether the DeKalb Planning Commission's action
constituted legislative or quasi-judicial action, the court of appeals
referenced O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3,"" which defines a "zoning decision" to
include, among other things, "the grant of a permit relating to a special
use of property." 7' The court of appeals concluded that the Planning
Commission's decision to approve the subdivision sketch plat was
analogous to approval of a special use permit because it requires the
proposed special use to meet certain objective criteria in an ordinance.3 7 ' Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the Planning
Commission's decision was not an exercise of legislative powers but was,
instead, a quasi-judicial action.so The superior court was thus bound
by the record and evidence the civic association and developer presented
to the Planning Commission and, therefore, the court could not consider
the developer's standing argument raised for the first time in connection
with the association's petition for certiorari review.381 As a result, the

371. Id. (quoting RCG Props., LLC v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment,, 260
Ga. App. 355, 361, 579 S.E.2d 782, 786 (2003)).
372. Id. at 493, 760 S.E.2d at 201.
373. Id. at 492, 760 S.E.2d at 200-01.
374. Id. at 492, 760 S.E.2d at 201.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3 (2012).
378. 328 Ga. App. at 493, 760 S.E.2d at 201 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)).
379. Id. at 494, 760 S.E.2d at 202.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 495, 760 S.E.2d at 202.
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Georgia Court of Appeals concluded the superior court erred in
dismissing the civic association's appeal for lack of standing and
remanded the case to the superior court for further review, excluding the
issue of the association or its members' standing.3 82
Finally, in Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm
Property Owners Ass'n,"" a property owners association sued to enjoin
Southern States from developing and operating a proposed landfill in
Bartow County, Georgia. Southern States' attempt to build the landfill
began in 1989 when it filed an application with the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (Georgia EPD), which required Southern
States to obtain a certificate of zoning compliance from Bartow County.
Bartow County refused to issue the certificate because its zoning
ordinance in effect at that time did not allow for a landfill on the
property. Subsequently, in 1994, the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated
the Bartow County ordinance upon which the denial was based."8
Southern States obtained a superior court order requiring Bartow
County to issue a certificate of zoning compliance under the next
applicable zoning ordinance from 1993, but Southern States "did little,
if anything, toward moving the project forward" and never submitted the
certificate to the Georgia EPD."'
Ten years later, in 2004, Southern States submitted a new permit
application for the landfill. The Bartow County zoning ordinance in
place in 2004 again did not permit a landfill on the property. The
county, however, assumed the proposed landfill was subject to the
previous court order and granted the certificate of zoning compliance.
The development of the landfill was delayed even further and, in 2012,
only after Bartow County issued a third certificate, did Southern States
finally submit the certificate of zoning compliance to the Georgia EPD.
While Southern States' application was still pending, the property
owners association filed a complaint, seeking to enjoin the proposed
landfill."8

382. Id. at 495, 760 S.E.2d at 202-03.
383. 331 Ga. App. 878, 769 S.E.2d 823 (2015), reconsiderationdenied (Apr. 7, 2015).
384. Id. at 879, 769 S.E.2d at 824, 825 (citing Tilley Props., Inc. v. Bartow Cnty., 261
Ga. 153, 154-55, 401 S.E.2d 527, 528 (1991)).
385. Id. at 879-80, 769 S.E.2d at 825.
386. Id. at 880, 769 S.E.2d at 825. While the lawsuit was pending, the Georgia EPD
approved the permit. Southern States filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the property
owners association was now required to exhaust administrative remedies with the Georgia
EPD before continuing the pending litigation. Id. The superior court denied the motion,
and the denial was affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals because the Georgia EPD's
approval did not resolve the issue of whether the landfill violated the county ordinance.
Id. at 881, 769 S.E.2d at 826.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

236

[Vol. 67

The superior court ultimately granted partial summary judgment in
the association's favor, finding that "whatever vested right Southern
States may have had [as a result if the 1994 certificate of zoning
compliance] lapsed when it failed to commence using the property as a
landfill within one year."' The superior court also found that Bartow
County should have applied the zoning ordinance in effect at the time
of Southern States' second application to the Georgia EPD in 2004 and
should have denied the newly requested certificate of zoning compliance.
Southern States appealed."
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that Southern States had the right
to develop and operate the landfill when the first certificate of zoning
compliance was issued by Bartow County pursuant to the 1993 zoning
ordinance." 9 That ordinance, however, clearly stated that any use "for
which a vested right was acquired . . . shall be prohibited unless such is
actually commenced within one year of the adoption of [the] ordinance." 390
The court of appeals next looked at whether Southern States
"commenced" its use of the property as a landfill within one year of
receiving its first certificate of zoning compliance in 1994.39' The court
of appeals read the 1993 ordinance in effect at that time to require
Southern States to undertake operations of the landfill within one year,
rather than merely submit paperwork.392 Southern States admitted
it did not begin operating the landfill within one or even ten years after
As a result, the court of appeals concluded
receiving the certificate. 9
the superior court was correct when it found that Southern States did
not retain a vested right to operate the landfill. 39 4 The court of
appeals, however, remanded the case to the superior court to determine
whether Bartow County's 1993 zoning ordinance was constitutional.9

387. Id. at 881, 769 S.E.2d at 825-26.
388. Id. at 881, 769 S.E.2d at 826.
389. Id. at 883, 769 S.E.2d at 827.
390. Id. at 884, 769 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting Zoning Ordinance Bartow County § 6.1.4
(effective Sept. 1993)).
391. Id.
392. Id. at 884-85, 769 S.E.2d at 828.
393. Id. at 885, 769 S.E.2d at 828.

394. Id.
395.

Id. at 886, 769 S.E.2d at 830.

